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Abstract
What is scientific progress? This paper advances an interpretation of
this question, and an account that serves to answer it (thus interpreted).
Roughly, the question is here understood to concern what type of cogni-
tive change with respect to a topic or phenomenon X constitutes a sci-
entific improvement (to a greater or lesser extent) with respect to X. The
answer explored in the paper is that the requisite type of cognitive change
occurs when scientific results are made publicly available so as to make
it possible for anyone to increase their understanding of X. This account
is briefly compared to two rival accounts of scientific progress, based re-
spectively on increasing truthlikeness and accumulating knowledge, and
is argued to be preferable to both.
1 Introduction
The progress of science is astounding. Just two centuries ago, people suffer-
ing from infectious diseases would have been told that their illnesses were
caused by ‘miasma’, i.e. impure air arising from decomposing organic matter.
Progress was made in the late 19th century, when the miasma theory was re-
placed by the theory that infectious diseases are caused by unobservably small
entities passing between organisms, i.e. ‘germs’. The progress that has since
been made builds on this theory, e.g. in the discovery that some infectious dis-
eases (such as tuberculosis and the plague) are caused by bacteria, while others
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(such as seasonal influenza and COVID-19) are caused by viruses. So at least
on the topic of infectious diseases, scientists have made significant progress
over the years. But why? In virtue of what do these developments count as
progressive? What is scientific progress?
It is natural to worry that this question is too ‘philosophical’, in the pejo-
rative sense of the term, to admit of a definitive answer. For example, Chang
describes it as “one of the most significant issues in the philosophy of science
today”, but then immediately notes its “immense difficulty” (Chang, 2007, 1).
Part of that difficulty is surely that the question itself can seem unclear, mis-
guided, and even pointless: (i) What would it even be to advance a philosophical
account of scientific progress? (ii) Doesn’t science progress in a variety of quite
different ways, depending on the scientific field, its methodology, or even the
particular research project in question? (iii) And even supposing that some
general account of scientific progress could be provided, what would be the
point of such an exercise?
In this paper, my first aim is to show that these worries can be convincingly
allayed. In response to (i), I will argue that the question, ‘What is scientific
progress?’, has at least one interpretation on which the question itself is per-
fectly clear and intelligible. In response to (ii), I will argue that, on this in-
terpretation, there is no particular reason to think that a general account of
scientific progress cannot be provided. Finally, in response to (iii), I will ar-
gue that this interpretation of the question makes evident why answering the
question thus interpreted is important – viz., not just because of its intrinsic
intellectual importance, but also due to the practical implications of different
answers.
My second main aim for this paper is to elaborate and argue for a particu-
lar answer to the question thus interpreted. This answer is based on the idea
that progress regarding some phenomenon consists in increasing our poten-
tial to understand that phenomenon, a proposal closely akin to what I have
previously called the noetic account of scientific progress (Dellsén, 2016). The
current paper develops this proposal by coupling it with a general definition
of ‘understanding’, and by specifying whose potential increase in understand-
ing is at issue. The resulting account is then compared to two rival accounts,
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which respectively define progress in terms of increasing truthlikeness and
accumulating knowledge, and defended against three potential objections.
2 The Question of Scientific Progress
As promised in the introduction, I start by clarifying the question at issue,
‘What is scientific progress?’, so as to make clear why it’s intelligible, tractable,
and important. I will proceed by first making a number of preliminary points
to precisify the relevant concept of scientific progress, before then returning
to the question itself, how to go about answering it, and why that matters.
A first thing to note is that scientific progress, in contrast to scientific change,
is a partly normative or evaluative concept, i.e. a ‘thick’ concept. To say that
science made progress between t1 and t2 is to say that there was some im-
provement in or of science between t1 and t2 (cf. Niiniluoto, 2019, §2.2). This
is not to say that the overall state of the world is better at t2 than t1, of course,
since other things might have changed for the worse between t1 and t2. Nev-
ertheless, something must improve in order for scientific progress to occur. It
follows immediately that choosing between accounts of scientific progress has
normative implications. For example, all else being equal, if one account im-
plies that successfully completing a research project would achieve scientific
progress while another account implies that no progress would be made even
on a successful completion of that project, then the first account, but not the
second, implies that scientists have some reason to pursue that project.
This in turn has important implications for the methodology most appro-
priate in debates about scientific progress. Specifically, this arguably means
that accounts of scientific progress should be tested against our considered
normative judgments, e.g. regarding whether to pursue some research project
at the expense of another. By contrast, they should not be tested against our
linguistic intuitions about whether we would initially and unreflectively be in-
clined to refer to a given episode as ‘scientific progress’. After all, if it turned
out that our shared linguistic understanding of the term ‘scientific progress’
as it is used in natural language implied that less ‘progressive’ projects should
generally be pursued at the expense of more ‘progressive’ projects, then we
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should surely modify, or re-engineer, the concept of scientific progress so as
to fit with our considered judgments about what sorts of pursuits are in fact
most valuable.1
Second, what is the ‘something’ that needs to improve between t1 and t2
in order for scientific progress to occur during this period? It’s tempting to
answer that it is science as a whole, or perhaps some particular scientific dis-
cipline. But for reasons noted by Niiniluoto (2019, §2.1), accounts of scientific
progress are not meant to cover all ways in which a scientific discipline could
improve. For example, a discipline could improve by virtue of receiving more
funding, by increasing its independence from pernicious outside influences, or
by increasing gender equality among scientists. Although such changes would
clearly be improvements in a general sense, the debate about scientific progress
concerns a narrower class of changes that Niiniluoto labels ‘cognitive’. Dell-
sén (2018, 2) characterizes these as having “to do with improvement in our
theories, hypotheses, or other representations of the world, rather than other
improvements of or within science”.
Third, some recent discussions of scientific progress have introduced a use-
ful distinction between what constitutes scientific progress and what merely
promotes it (see, e.g., Bird 2008, 280; Dellsén 2016, 73). A cognitive change
constitutes progress when the change is an improvement in some respect re-
gardless of what other changes are thereby brought about, or made more likely
to be brought about, at some later time. By contrast, a cognitive change pro-
motes progress when the change is an improvement only in so far as later
changes are brought about, or made more likely to be brought about (i.e. prob-
abilified), by that cognitive change. Both constituting and promoting progress
thus count as improvements, but the latter counts as an improvement only
in virtue of leading to or probabilifying an occurrence of the former at some
1This type of philosophical methodology dates back to Carnap (1962), but has recently
been revived under various labels such as ‘conceptual engineering’ (Cappelen, 2018), ‘con-
ceptual ethics’ (Burgess and Plunkett, 2013a,b), and ‘ameliorative analysis’ (Haslanger, 2013).
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later time.2 For example, consider the formulation of a new concept that is
subsequently used to state a theory that, let’s suppose, is an improvement on
previous theories in some domain. The formulation of this concept would
arguably not itself constitute progress, but it would definitely promote it in
so far as it helps scientists to state, and thus eventually accept, a progressive
theory.3
It should be clear that, depending on the the phenomenon in question, a
number of quite different things might promote progress to a greater or lesser
extent. For example, randomized controlled trials promote progress on the ef-
fectiveness of medical treatments, while computer simulation models promote
progress on biological and economic systems (and not normally vice versa).
As this makes clear, there is no reason to think there is a unified general story
to tell about what promotes progress across all scientific disciplines. Indeed,
what presently promotes progress within some discipline might cease to do
so, or do so to a lesser extent, in the future, given technological or method-
ological changes. So there is a strong case to be made for a kind of ‘pluralism’
about what promotes progress. Note, however, that it does not follow that
we should be pluralists about what constitutes progress, since these different
ways of promoting progress might well be instrumental for achieving the same
type of cognitive improvement.
Fourth, scientific progress is gradable — a matter of degree — in the sense
that a given episode can be more or less progressive, perhaps in addition to be-
ing progressive outright (in a binary sense).4 Although some theorists fail to
address what determines degrees of progress, instead providing accounts only
2Hence, one can test for whether (one judges that) a given scientific improvement consti-
tutes or promotes progress with a thought experiment in which one imagines that the episode
in question either has no effects whatsoever or that its effects are clearly do not constitute
progress. If the episode is still an improvement, it constitutes progress; if not, it promotes
progress.
3See Rowbottom (2015, 104) for another type of example of something that could promote
progress without constituting it in certain circumstances, viz. flatly false beliefs that lead to
future progress.
4Consequently, an episode may also promote more and less progress, corresponding to how
much progress it leads to or probabilifies. This can be measured as the probability-weighted
average of degrees of progress in all epistemically possible scenarios, mirroring the definition
of expected utility in standard decision theory.
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of outright progress,5 this is arguably an unmotivated restriction of the topic.
If at all possible, an account of scientific progress should explain not just why
a given episode is progressive, but also why it is more or less progressive than
another episode — at least when the two episodes concern the same topic. For
example, an account of scientific progress worth its salt should explain why
adopting Tycho Brahe’s geo-heliocentric model of the solar system would not
have constituted as much progress as adopting Kepler’s version of Coperni-
cus’s heliocentric model, even though adopting either model would arguably
have been an improvement on the earlier Ptolemaic model.
A fifth and final point is that we can distinguish between a topic-specific
concept of scientific progress (progress-on-X), and a more general, across-topic
concept of scientific progress (overall progress). Consider an episode that ex-
hibits cognitive improvement with respect to one topic X1, and yet simultane-
ously exhibits the opposite, i.e. cognitive decline, with respect to another topic
X2. How should we describe such an episode in terms of scientific progress?
Well, if we are using a topic-specific concept of scientific progress, progress-
on-X, such an episode can simply be described as simultaneously exhibiting
progress on X1, and the opposite of progress, i.e. regress, on X2. On the other
hand, if we are using the general, across-topic concept of overall progress, then
the question of whether there is progress in that sense during the episode pre-
sumably turns on whether the there was enough progress made on X1 to out-
weigh the regress on X2. This suggests that overall progress can be defined
as the aggregation or sum of degrees of progress (and regress) on the various
different topics X1, X2, etc., on which cognitive change takes place during an
episode.6 Since progress-on-X therefore seems to be the more fundamental
notion of the two, we will primarily be concerned with it in what follows.
5For example, Bird (2007, 84) explicitly declines to address degrees of progress on the
grounds that “it is a much more difficult question” than what determines outright progress.
6In my view, the most plausible approach to aggregating progress on different topics in
this way into a notion of overall progress would take the weighted sum of progress on each
topic, where the weights assigned to progress on each topic is determined by the scientific
significance, in Kitcher’s (2001; 2011) sense, of the topic in question. Thus if making progress
on the evolution of human beings is of greater scientific significance than making progress on
the evolution of sea urchins, for example, then the former would contribute more to overall
scientific progress than the latter.
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To summarize, then: scientific progress is a type of improvement over time,
so characterizing a change as progressive has immediate normative implica-
tions; this improvement concerns cognitive changes specifically, rather than
other types of improvements in or of science; the question as to what con-
stitutes such progress can, and should, be distinguished from what promotes
it; scientific progress is gradable, in the sense that an episode can be said to
be more or less progressive in addition to being outright progressive; and fi-
nally, a concept of progress-on-X can be distinguished from, and yet used to
define, a concept of overall progress. With all this in mind, we can say that the
seemingly simple question ‘What is scientific progress?’ can be precisified as
follows:
(Q) What type of cognitive change with respect to a given topic X constitutes
a (greater or lesser degree of) scientific improvement with respect to X?
In the introduction, I mentioned three types of worries about our original
question, ‘What is scientific progress?’. The first was that the question was
unclear. That, I submit, need no longer worry us, since that question can now
be replaced by the painstakingly precise (Q). The second worry was that sci-
ence clearly progresses in different ways, depending on the scientific field,
methodology, or research project. That worry is assuaged by pointing out that
different disciplines may promote progress in different ways even if the same
type of cognitive change constitutes progress across those disciplines. Further-
more, by relativizing progress to a particular topic X, we have opened up the
possibility that what constitutes progress with regard to one topic X1 could
differ from what constitutes progress with regard to another topic X2. Finally,
the worry that an account of scientific progress would be pointless is clearly
misconceived, since as we have seen the question of progress is ultimately a
normative question that has direct implications for what scientists ought to
focus their time and resources on. It is thus an issue that is of obvious rele-
vance not only to philosophers of science, but also to science administrators
and working scientists.
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3 The Noetic Account, Revised and Elaborated
In this section, I develop an account of scientific progress, i.e. an answer to (Q),
that centers around the concept of understanding. To a first approximation, the
account holds that scientific progress with respect to X consists in a change in
the publicly available information about X that helps us increase our under-
standing of X; where an ‘increased understanding’ is in turn defined as having
a more accurate or comprehensive model of X’s dependence relations, such as
its causal relations. In so far as such dependence relations ground explanation
and prediction, e.g. through causal explanation, this account implies a strong
link between scientific progress, on the one hand, and explanation and predic-
tion, on the other. In this respect, the current account resembles the original
noetic account (Dellsén, 2016). Indeed, although there are differences between
the two accounts — some of which will be brought out below — the former is
sufficiently close to the latter to be viewed as a modification and elaboration
of it as opposed to a competing account. In what follows, I spell out this new
version of the noetic account.
Let me first make a methodological point: In what follows, I offer a defini-
tion of the the relevant notion of understanding, before defining progress in
terms of that notion. Although I believe that this definition of understanding
is at least as plausible as any alternative definition on offer,7 I will not pro-
vide any arguments to that effect in what follows. Indeed, those who prefer a
different definition of their concept of understanding may take the definition
that I offer here as purely stipulative. After all, our concern is ultimately not
with the nature of understanding as such, but rather with scientific progress
— i.e., with answering (Q). For those purposes it is merely a matter of ter-
minology whether an account is stated in terms of a commonly-used notion of
understanding or in terms of the concepts used below to attempt to define that
notion. Thus, if you prefer, you may take ‘understanding’ to be a mere label
for the cognitive state, described below, in terms of which the noetic account
7For arguments that it is superior, see Dellsén 2020. Rival accounts are provided by, among
others, Strevens (2013), Wilkenfeld (2013), Grimm (2014), Bengson (2015), Elgin (2017),





The definition of understanding to which I appeal in what follows makes use
of the notion of a dependency model. This is a model of the dependence re-
lations that aspects of a given phenomenon stands in, or fails to stand in, to
other aspects of the phenomenon, or of other phenomena. Such a model thus
contains information about relations between aspects of phenomena — both
‘positive’ information about how they are related, and ‘negative’ information
about how they fail to be related. The relations in question are dependence rela-
tions, the paradigmatic instance of which is causation, but which may include
other dependence relations such as grounding. The relata of these relations are
variables, rather than specific or actual values of such variables; they may be
either continuous (e.g., an object’s mass m) or discreet (e.g., a population size
N). Thus dependence relations encode information not just about the actual
state of affairs of some phenomenon, but how specifically the phenomenon
would have been different if other things had been different in some specific
way.
So a dependency model of a phenomenon, in so far as it is accurate and
comprehensive, encodes information about dependencies. Most dependency
models that are even just somewhat accurate and comprehensive will be enor-
mously complex, but let me illustrate with a simple, toy example. According
to Hooke’s law, the force exerted by a spring on an object fastened to it and
displaced at a distance x from a relaxed position, is given by Fs = −kx, where
k is a positive constant specifying the ‘stiffness’ of the spring (and the minus
sign signals that that the force Fs is opposite to that of the displacement x). If
the object is pulled a distance x and then released, then assuming as an ide-
alization that no other forces act on the object, the force Fs will accelerate the
object towards its relaxed position in accordance with Newton’s second law,
F = ma. Hence the object’s acceleration when released will be a = −kxm . This
tells us a great deal about what the object’s acceleration depends on, e.g. its
mass; and, indeed about what it does not depend on, e.g. its volume. This is
paradigmatic example of a (very simple) dependency model, in this case of a
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composite phenomenon consisting of an elastic spring and an object attached
to it.
In the above example, all the dependence relations involved are causal —
at least arguably so. As I have intimated, however, this is not always the case.
Suppose we supplement this model with information about how the spring’s
stiffness k is determined. Now, k can clearly be calculated by referring back to
values of the force Fs and distance x in a given instance. But what k depends
on has to do with various facts about the string itself, e.g. its length at relaxed
position, the number of coils, the diameters of those coils, and the material
from which the spring is constructed. The relation between k and these facts
about the spring is arguably not causation; rather, it is something closer to
grounding.8 So a more comprehensive dependency model of the spring and
its attached object includes these arguably-non-causal dependence relations
as well. An even more comprehensive dependency model would contain even
more (causal or non-causal) information of this sort.
A more accurate dependency model, by contrast, would correct some of the
inaccuracies contained in the above model. For example, it is of course not true
of any real system of this sort that the only force that acts on the object is that
due to the spring’s pull. Hence we cannot really identify the F in F =ma with
the Fs in Fs = −kx, as would strictly speaking be required to derive a = −kxm . For
example, if the spring and object are located on an horizontal surface, then a
(non-zero) friction force, Ff = −µmg, will act against Fs, so that F = Fs − Ff .
From this it follows immediately that a = Fm = −
kx
m + µg. We thus have a more
accurate dependency model of the spring and the attached object, e.g. in that
we see that (and how) the acceleration of the object depends on the friction
between the object and the surface. For instance, this reveals that the effect of
friction on acceleration does not depend on the object’s mass.




So much for dependency models. What has this got to do with understand-
ing in science? Well, on the view of scientific understanding I favor (Dellsén,
2020), the latter can be defined in terms of the former: An agent S understands
X if and only if S grasps a sufficiently accurate and comprehensive depen-
dency model of X; and S’s degree of understanding of X is proportional to the
accuracy and comprehensiveness of their dependency model of X. I note im-
mediately that the target of this type of understanding, X, is some part of our
world; not a mere representation thereof, such as a theory, concept, or expla-
nation. In the literature on understanding, the type of understanding here
defined is often referred to as ‘objectual understanding’, and often contrasted
with ‘understanding why’ or ‘explanatory understanding’ (see, e.g., Kvanvig,
2003; Khalifa, 2013; Kelp, 2015). I note also that there are many terms that
intentionally do not occur in this definition, including notably ‘justified’ and
‘know’. As we shall see, understanding can come apart from what philoso-
phers typically mean by these these terms.
What about truth? Well, it follows immediately from the definition above
that an increase in understanding of X can be identified having a more ac-
curate, or more comprehensive, dependency model of X. Thus incorporat-
ing true information into one’s dependency model of X, in so far as it reveals
something about the relevant dependence relations, will necessarily increase
one’s understanding of X. In this sense, understanding is taken to be ‘fac-
tive’. And yet this definition allows for departures from the truth to increase
understanding, most obviously since incorporating an intentional approxima-
tion, deliberately containing a slight falsehood, can significantly increase the
comprehensiveness of a model at the expense of a small loss of accuracy. To
return to our earlier example, setting F = Fs — although strictly false, since Ff
is non-zero — initially contributed to understanding the object’s acceleration.
However, as the subsequently modified version of the example also illustrates,
we would in that case gain even more understanding by de-approximating and
instead setting F = Fs −Ff .
Many theorists associate understanding very closely with explanation (e.g.,
Strevens, 2013; de Regt, 2017; Khalifa, 2017). On the above definition, this is
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correct only in so far as understanding consists in modelling the dependence
relations that form the ontological basis for explanation. Thus it is true that,
when it’s possible to explain X or aspects of X, a completely accurate and
comprehensive understanding of X will provide all the information needed
for such explanation. However, understanding can also consist in the real-
ization that a phenomenon or some aspect thereof cannot be explained at all,
or that it cannot be explained by some particular other phenomenon or as-
pect thereof. For example, we noted before that the decrease of acceleration
due to friction exerted on an object moving on a horizontal surface does not
depend on its mass; hence it cannot be explained by its mass. Nevertheless,
incorporating this very fact — that the decreased acceleration due to friction
does not depend on the object’s mass — into our dependency model increases
our understanding of the object’s acceleration. So understanding, by the above
definition, is in this way a more general concept than explanation, and should
not simply be identified, for example, with the cognitive benefits of explana-
tion.
Related to this is the fact that understanding brings with it cognitive ben-
efits other than explanation. Chief among these are manipulation and pre-
diction. Consider the spring again. Suppose you want to modify the surface
on which the object is placed so as to make sure that it does not move at all
when released at a distance x from the spring’s relaxed position. You might do
this by replacing a smooth surface with one that is covered in sandpaper, for
example. If you grasp the final dependency model described above, in which
a = −kxm + µg, this can be achieved by setting a = 0 and then isolating the fric-
tion coefficient µ = kxmg , which measures the extent to which object’s and the
surface’s create friction with one another. This will tell you what grit size you
need for the sandpaper, for example, so as to get the object to stay put at a
distance of exactly x from a relaxed position. Similarly, in the case of predic-
tion, you want to know what will happen given the current state of the spring
— or what would happen given some counterfactual state of the spring. Your
understanding, via your dependency model, tells you precisely that, e.g. by
revealing what the acceleration of the object will be when released at distance
x, or would be if released at some alternative distance x′.
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3.3 Scientific Progress
Now, how do we get from this definition of understanding to an account of
scientific progress, i.e. an answer to (Q)? We might say that scientific progress,
i.e. the type of cognitive change with respect to a given phenomenon X that
constitutes scientific improvement relative to X, is increased understanding of
X. However, this is incomplete as it stands, since it fails to specify whose un-
derstanding increases in scientifically progressive episodes. Indeed, there is
a more general question in the vicinity here that applies to any account of
scientific progress, viz. whose cognitive attitudes must in some way improve
in order for scientific progress to take place? In so far as this question has
been discussed at all, the agents or groups in question have been assumed to
be the relevant scientists themselves, either individually or collectively as a
group.9 Applied to an understanding-based account, this implies that scien-
tific progress relative to X occurs precisely when scientists themselves (indi-
vidually or collectively) increase their understanding of X.
On further reflection, however, this exclusive focus on scientists‘ own cog-
nitive attitudes seems unmotivated. If all that really improved through sci-
entifically progressive episodes were scientists‘s own attitudes, e.g. their un-
derstanding, then why should non-scientists care about scientific progress at
all? In particular, how could the extensive funding of ‘pure’ scientific re-
search, with no clear practical benefits for non-scientists, be justified if sci-
entific progress merely consisted in some scientists improving their cognitive
attitudes? In light of this, I suggest we move to a conception of scientific
progress according to which it is not the cognitive attitudes of those by whom
scientific progress is made that determine whether an episode is progressive;
rather, progress is determined by the publicly available information, such as
that contained in peer-reviewed journal articles, on the basis of which any rel-
9Some earlier discussions of scientific progress (e.g., Bird, 2007; Dellsén, 2016) appear to
assume that progress is determined by changes in scientists’ individual attitudes. More re-
cently, Bird (2019) (see also Ross 2020 and Harris 2021) have argued that it is the collective
attitudes of scientific communities that determine progress, rather than their individual at-
titudes. Niiniluoto (2017, 2399) refers to it as a “hidden assumption” that “the primary ap-
plication of the notion of scientific progress concerns successive theories which have been ac-
cepted by the scientific community”.
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evant member of society (including scientists but not excluding non-scientists)
can form or maintain the relevant type of cognitive attitudes. In the case of the
noetic account, then, I suggest that what matters to progress on X is whether
changes due to scientific research in the publicly available information makes
it possible for relevant members of society to increase their understanding of
X.10
We are now — finally! — in a position to formulate a revised noetic account
of scientific progress:
The (new) noetic account: The type of cognitive change with respect to a
given phenomenon X that constitutes (a greater or lesser degree of) scien-
tific improvement relative to X is a change due to scientific research in the
publicly available information that enables relevant members of society to
increase their understanding of X.
This somewhat Procrustean formulation of the account is meant to explicitly
mirror the question to which it is an answer, (Q). More colloquially, the noetic
account thus reformulated holds that scientific progress consists in making
scientific information available that helps us as a society to better understand
relevant phenomena. Given the identification of understanding with depen-
dency modelling, scientific progress enables us to model dependencies in these
and related phenomena—which, in turn, helps us explain, manipulate and
predict them on a regular basis.
At this point it is worth reiterating that there may be many different ways of
promoting scientific progress even if there is a single type of cognitive change
that constitutes progress (see §2). On the noetic account in particular, any
episode that causes or raises the probability of enabling relevant members
of society to increase their understanding promotes scientific progress. Thus
most of the everyday activities of working scientists — including, for exam-
ple, experimentation and observation, theoretical exploration, and developing
10A great deal more could be said about what constitutes ‘publicly available information’,
who counts as ‘relevant members’ of society, and how information might ‘make it possible’
for them to increase their understanding. However, since nothing in what follows depends on
how the noetic account is spelled out in these respects, I’ll leave that for another occasion (see
Dellsén, ms).
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novel methods — will promote scientific progress on the noetic account, be-
cause and in so far as these are important steps towards enabling us to increase
our understanding of some phenomena. To say that these activities promote
progress is emphatically not to say that they are less important than those
that constitute progress. After all, a given episode (e.g. an especially decisive
experiment) might promote a great deal more progress than another episode
(e.g. a minor modification to a causal model) constitutes, in which case there is
a straightforward sense in which the former is more important than the latter
as far as scientific progress is concerned.11
4 Rival Accounts of Scientific Progress
In this section, I consider two of the main rivals to the noetic account of scien-
tific progress, viz. the truthlikeness account initially proposed by Popper (1963,
1979) and subsequently developed by Niiniluoto (1980, 1984, 2014, 2017),
and the epistemic account, as formulated and defended by Bird (2007, 2008,
2016, 2019).12 For each such account, I will compare it to the noetic account
— highlighting the points on which the accounts are in agreement, and ex-
plaining where they diverge — and then briefly argue that the noetic account
improves on its rival.
11Indeed, we might even want to say that the former is, in some general sense, “more pro-
gressive” than the latter. I have no quarrel with this way of speaking as long as we then keep
firmly in mind that accounts of scientific progress (including the noetic account) are not as
they stand meant to directly explicate this general sense of the term. In order for them to do
so, these accounts would have to be modified so as to include, in the explicans, not only the
conditions under which they take progress (in the narrower sense) to occur, but also the con-
ditions under which they take progress (in the narrower sense) to be promoted.
12Given the limited space of a journal article, my discussions of these accounts will in-
evitably be quite brief. I also lack the space to discuss the functional account (Kuhn, 1970;
Laudan, 1977, 1981b; Shan, 2019), non-standard versions of the truthlikeness and epistemic
accounts (e.g., Aronson et al., 1994; Barnes, 1991; Northcott, 2013; Park, 2017), hybrid ac-
counts (e.g., Bangu, 2015; Goebel, 2019), and various other accounts that have been proposed
(e.g., Douglas, 2014; Rowbottom, 2019; Saatsi, 2019).
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4.1 The Truthlikeness Account
Briefly, the truthlikeness account holds that scientific progress occurs when
accepted scientific theories get closer to the truth, i.e. become more truthlike.
In the special case of one theory T1 being replaced with another theory T2 (with
no other changes or additions to accepted theories), scientific progress occurs
if and only if T1 is more truthlike than T2. The key notion of truthlikeness (or
verisimilitude) is meant to measure the extent to which a theory captures the
complete truth about the world in a given conceptual framework. Thus, one
way in which T2 may be more truthlike than T1 is if T1 makes true (or largely
true) claims on which T2 is silent, since T2 would thus capture a larger part of
the complete truth about the world than T1. Another way for T2 to be more
truthlike than T1 is if T2 merely corrects some false claims made by T1. In both
cases, replacing T1 with T2 would thus constitute progress on the truthlikeness
account.
In Niiniluoto’s version of the truthlikeness account, which is the most de-
veloped account of this sort in the literature, the truthlikeness of a scientific
theory T is defined relative to a language L. Roughly, T ’s truthlikeness is then
a measure of the similarity between a maximally specific claim C* in L, which
fully captures everything that is true, and a disjunction of other such maxi-
mally specific claims (C1 ∨ ... ∨ Cn) in L, which captures the content of T by
effectively listing all the maximally specific possible states of affairs allowed
by T (Niiniluoto 1987; see also Oddie 1986). This definition of truthlikeness
brings out a rather notorious problem for truthlikeness accounts, viz. that ex-
tant definitions are ‘language-dependent’ in the sense that the truthlikeness of
T may be higher or lower in another conceptual framework L′ as compared to
L. In so far as it is implausible that there is any single objectively correct con-
ceptual framework relative to which truthlikeness can be defined, this leads
to progress being language-relative. It is a matter of contention whether this
is a serious problem for the truthlikeness account (see, e.g., Miller, 2006; Bird,
2016; Oddie, 2016; Niiniluoto, 2017); since this is well-trodden terrain, I will
not comment further on this issue here.
In comparing the truthlikeness account to the noetic account, the first thing
to say is that the two accounts are similar in two important respects. First,
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the intuitive notion of truthlikeness (of theories) corresponds quite closely
to the noetic account’s dual notions of accuracy and comprehensiveness (of
dependency models). Thus, were it not for certain connotations in the term
‘truthlikeness’, such as the language-relativity therein and its focus on theo-
ries rather than dependency models, it would not be too misleading to state
the noetic account in terms of increasing truthlikeness of dependency mod-
els.13 Second, the truthlikeness account resembles the noetic account in im-
posing no distinctively epistemic requirements on scientific progress, such as
the requirement that progressive theories or models be epistemically justified.
Of course, as Niiniluoto (2017, 3299-3300) notes, accepted scientific theories
generally enjoy at least some degree of empirical confirmation, but it does not
follow on either account that scientific progress cannot occur in the absence of
the type of justification required for knowledge (more on this in §4.2).
Regarding the differences between the noetic and truthlikeness accounts,
note that where the truthlikeness account focuses on (increasingly truthlike)
theories, the noetic account focuses on (increasingly accurate and comprehen-
sive) dependency models. The main difference between these is that dependency
models target specific phenomena in the world, whereas theories are more
general and abstract claims with no particular target.14 Of course, the two
are not unrelated. As some of my examples above intimate, scientists use (or
apply) theories to gain understanding of phenomena, i.e. to construct depen-
dency models thereof. Earlier we used Hooke’s law, Fs = −kx, together with
Newton’s second law of motion, F = ma, to construct a dependency model
of a (hypothetical) system consisting of an elastic spring and an attached ob-
ject. This model reveals that, and how, the object’s acceleration depends on its
mass m, the displacement distance x, and the spring’s stiffness k. Since true or
13This might seem to suggest that the noetic account comes close to characterizing scientific
progress as increasing legisimilitude, i.e. closeness to (true) laws of nature (see, e.g., Cohen,
1980; Niiniluoto, 1983). However, I would resist the characterization of dependence relations
as laws of nature, since (i) many dependence relations are much too specific and fragile to
count as laws (see Woodward, 2003, 239-314), and (ii) some of the relevant dependence rela-
tions may be mathematical or logical rather than nomological (see Baron et al., 2017).
14On many accounts of scientific modelling, this is a common difference between mod-
els and theories in general. See, e.g., Cartwright (1983); Giere (1988); Bailer-Jones (2013);
Weisberg (2013).
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truthlike theories undergird understanding in this way, they are profoundly
important for scientific progress from the noetic account’s point of view.
With that said, increasing understanding and increasing truthlikeness can
come apart; when they do, progress follows the former rather than the latter.
Consider first cases in which already existing theories are used to construct
new dependency models that are either more accurate or more comprehensive
than previous models. In such cases, theory stands still while understanding
marches on. Our simple example of the spring provides a case in point. In
constructing the dependency model of the system, with which we see (among
other things) what and how the object’s acceleration depends on, we did not
increase the truthlikeness of our theories. There is a sense in which a new
‘theory’ was added when we derived a = −kxm from Hooke’s law and Newton’s
second law of motion. However, precisely because this ‘theory’ follows logi-
cally from previously accepted theories, and thus adds no logical content to
them, it cannot possibly increase the truthlikeness of accepted theories. Thus
the truthlikeness theorist is forced to say, implausibly, that there is no progress
in cases of this sort.
Another way in which increasing understanding can come apart from in-
creasing truthlikeness concerns the use of idealizations to gain understand-
ing. For our purposes, idealizations can be understood as falsehoods that are
deliberately included in some representation. Now, in some cases, accepting
theories with idealizations increases the truthlikeness of accepted theories in
a straightforward way, since the idealized theory may capture part of the com-
plete truth of the world in a way that previous theories failed to do — even
when the new theory contains an idealization and is thus false (Niiniluoto,
2017, 3298). So to see how the noetic and truthlikeness account diverge in
this respect, we must look to cases in which idealizations play a role in scien-
tific progress even when more truthlike versions of the relevant theories are,
15In the latter case, keeping the idealized theory would not strictly speaking constitute
progress so much as the alternative course of action, i.e. discarding the theory, would con-
stitute regress. For the sake of simplicity, I have presented accounts of scientific progress
as focusing on progressive episodes, but such accounts must also account for the opposite of
progress, i.e. regress, and the lack of either progress or regress, i.e. what we might call ‘flatlin-
ing’.
18
or could be, accepted. Specifically, the cases I have in mind are those where
a true or truthlike theory is accepted, and yet a corresponding idealized (and
thus less truthlike) theory is either adopted or kept on the books15 because the
latter facilitates understanding in a way that former fails to do.16
To use a familiar example, consider that the standard derivation of Boyle’s
law (P ∝ 1V ) assumes that the molecules in a gas never collide with each other.
Since this assumption is blatantly false of any real gas, the set of theories used
in the derivation of Boyle’s law is clearly less truthlike than an alternative set of
theories. In particular, this false assumption can be replaced with the true as-
sumption that the molecules do collide but these collisions balance each other
out. Indeed, Boyle’s law can be derived from this set of strictly true theories as
well, so the truthlikeness account cannot even claim that the idealization here
is a ‘necessary evil’ in our path towards true or truthlike theories. So why is
the blatantly false assumption that molecules don’t collide kept on the books
at all, as part of the publicly available information that scientists, engineers,
and others, can draw upon? Why not throw it out like any other falsehood that
has been replaced by a true or more truthlike alternative?
Roughly following Strevens’s (2008; 2017) account of idealization, I sug-
gest that the answer is that the idealization facilitates understanding in a way
that the non-idealized assumption does not. The inclusion of such an obvious
falsehood — that the molecules don’t collide at all — is a way of highlighting
the absence of a dependence relation — in this case, between Boyle’s law hold-
ing of a particular gas, on the one hand, and whether and the extent to which
its molecules collide with each other, on the other hand. Put differently, the
idealization conveys in an especially dramatic way that for Boyle’s law to hold
of a given gas, it is irrelevant whether collisions occur between the molecules
in the gas. This is the type of ‘negative’ information about a phenomenon’s
dependence relations that is involved in understanding the phenomenon on
the noetic account (see §3). Thus, on the noetic account, the derivation of
Boyle’s law from idealized assumptions constitutes progress, even when a non-
idealizing derivation is available.
16In Weisberg’s (2007, 642) terminology, these fall under ‘minimalist idealizations’.
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The standard derivation of Boyle’s law is but one example among many in
which a set of theories containing an idealization provides more understand-
ing than its de-idealized counterpart. It does this in virtue of revealing some-
thing about what the target phenomenon doesn’t depend on.17 Here’s another
example. Derivations of trajectories of planets around stars frequently assume
that both the planets and the stars are point masses, i.e. extensionless particles
with positive masses. Of course, we know that this is not just false, but impos-
sible. This would be a problem if the assumption of point masses was meant to
convey ‘positive’ information about what the planets’ trajectories do depend
on; however, as a way of conveying ‘negative’ information about what these
trajectories do not depend on, the assumption of something impossible serves
as an especially vivid way to flag that the trajectories do not depend on the
volumes of planets or stars. Thus, while including this idealization — this
blatant falsehood — clearly doesn’t increase the truthlikeness of our theories,
it does increase our understanding of the planets’ trajectories.
To sum up the discussion so far, then, the noetic account comes apart from
the truthlikeness account in at least two ways. On the one hand, the noetic
account counts as progressive episodes in which already-accepted theories are
applied to increase our understanding of specific phenomena. On the other
hand, the noetic account also counts as progressive episodes in which idealiza-
tions are introduced to convey what a target phenomenon does not depend on
— even when non-idealized alternatives are available. In both cases, the noetic
account expands the range of progressive episodes from what is counted as
such by the truthlikeness account.
Are there also episodes which the truthlikeness account counts as progres-
sive while the noetic account does not? Such cases would have to involve in-
creases in the truthlikeness of accepted theories that fail to increase our un-
derstanding of relevant phenomena. However, from the noetic account’s point
of view, the point of proposing new theories in science is to increase our un-
derstanding in one way or another. Consequently, there should be very few
17This is not to say that idealizations are the only way to convey information about what
a target phenomenon doesn’t depend on. It may just be a particularly efficient way of doing
so, especially in cases where one is also seeking to convey information about what the target
phenomenon does depend on (and how exactly it depends on those factors).
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if any cases in actual scientific practice of increasingly truthlike theories that
fail to increase understanding in at least some way. Even theories that are far
removed from empirical reality, such as string theory, contain a great deal of
information about dependencies (e.g. that a particle’s mass depends on the
vibrational state of the corresponding string), and thus potentially provide us
with great deal of understanding.
But although cases of increasing truthlikeness without increasing under-
standing will be rare in scientific practice, we can easily conceive of hypo-
thetical cases. Consider entirely spurious correlations: statistical correlations
between two or more phenomena, e.g. X and Y , that aren’t due to any depen-
dence (e.g. causal) relationship between those phenomena, or between each
one and some other phenomenon, Z. For example, it is presumably entirely
spurious that the average margarine consumption in the U.S. was highly cor-
related (r = 0.9926) with divorce rates in the state of Maine in the years 2000-
2009 (Vigen, 2015, 18-20). The ‘theory’ that these two quantities are correlated
is truthlike — indeed, fully true. So if this correlation were to be accepted, it
would presumably constitute progress on the truthlikeness account. However,
this ‘theory’ arguably couldn’t increase anyone’s understanding of either U.S.
margarine consumption or Maine divorce rates, since it fails to tell us any-
thing about what these quantities depend on, e.g. what causes or grounds
them. Thus the acceptance of this claim would not constitute progress on the
noetic account, regardless of how truthlike it is.
One might worry that the noetic account goes too far in discounting spuri-
ous correlations as non-progressive. Does this imply that searching for correla-
tions is never a worthwhile scientific practice? Not at all. Although correlation
is not causation — or any kind of dependence relation, for that matter — the
former is normally a (fallible) guide to the latter. Thus, correlation normally
promotes progress on the noetic account, e.g. through prompting a more se-
rious study of the correlated variables where researchers control for possible
confounders. However, this only holds when the correlations in question are
not entirely spurious in the above sense, i.e. when the correlation is due to
a dependence relationship between those phenomena or between them and a
third phenomenon. So, on the noetic account, entirely spurious correlations
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do not even promote progress in the way that non-spurious correlations nor-
mally do, which explains why they seem so frivolous from a scientific point of
view.
4.2 The Epistemic Account
Briefly, Bird’s (2007; 2016) epistemic account holds that scientific progress oc-
curs precisely when scientists accumulate knowledge. The key term ‘knowledge’
is notoriously difficult to define, and Bird agrees with Williamson (2000) that
it is unanalyzable and sui generis. Regardless, Bird follows epistemological
orthodoxy in taking knowledge to require truth, belief, and epistemic justifi-
cation. That is, one cannot know something unless it is true, one believes it,
and one is justified in believing it. Two of these three requirements, viz. truth
and belief, have analogues in the noetic and truthlikeness accounts in so far as
both require representations to be accurate/truthlike, and that these represen-
tations are, or could be, in some sense accepted, adopted, or grasped. By con-
trast, no version of the requirement that progressive theories be epistemically
justified is present in either of the noetic or truthlikeness account.18 Thus, al-
though other components of the epistemic account might also be problematic,
we shall focus on the justification requirement in what follows.
Before we begin, however, let me clarify that to reject a justification require-
ment on scientific progress is not tantamount to claiming that the practice of
seeking confirmation for scientific claims plays no role in the progress of sci-
ence. Far from it. The point of scientific confirmation is to separate, as far
as possible, fact from fiction. For the noetic account, the relevant facts are
those that can be used to construct models of dependence relations, which in
turn constitute understanding. Without scientific confirmation, these mod-
els would generally be woefully inaccurate, and thus fail to constitute under-
standing. Moreover, even if by some fluke an unconfirmed model were to be
sufficiently accurate to increase our understanding, in the absence of scientific
18Note that the notion of understanding with which the noetic account operates (see §3.1)
does not require epistemic justification. This is in line with arguments that understanding
differs from knowledge in this respect (Hills, 2016; Dellsén, 2017).
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confirmation we would not be able to tell it apart from alternative, inaccurate
models. Consequently, an unconfirmed but accurate model would rarely, if
ever, in fact be used by any of us to increase our understanding. For these rea-
sons, scientific confirmation certainly promotes progress on the noetic account
— and so, in a sense, plays a key role in the progress of science.
What really separates the epistemic from the noetic account (and from the
truthlikeness account)19 is whether epistemic justification, i.e. the type of jus-
tification required for knowledge, partly constitutes scientific progress. Ac-
cording to the epistemic account, a scientific theory or model that fails to be
epistemically justified cannot constitutively contribute to scientific progress,
because such a theory or model would fail to be known. Indeed, Bird argues
for the epistemic account by appealing to actual and hypothetical cases in
which scientists form unjustified, but nevertheless true, beliefs about scientific
phenomena. In these cases, Bird claims that the epistemic account “accords
with the verdict of intuition”, while not requiring justification for progress
“conflicts with what we are intuitively inclined to say” (Bird, 2007, 66). For
example, Bird says that that it would not have been progressive for scientists
to accept Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift when Wegener first pro-
posed it in 1912, because the theory was not sufficiently justified at the time
to count as knowledge. Although Bird is targeting the truthlikeness account
here, his argument would apply also to the noetic account if Wegener’s the-
ory would have been made publicly available in a way that made it possible
for relevant members of society to increase their understanding of relevant
phenomena, e.g. the lithosphere of the Earth.
Many commentators disagree with Bird’s intuitions about such cases (Row-
bottom, 2008; Cevolani and Tambolo, 2013; Niiniluoto, 2014; Dellsén, 2016).20
More importantly, it is unclear why (alleged) facts about what “we are intu-
itively inclined to say” should count for much at all in discussions of scientific
progress. After all, as noted above, the question of progress is an unmistak-
19I will focus on contrasting the epistemic and noetic accounts in what follows, but my crit-
icism of the epistemic should also be congenial to those who favor the truthlikeness account.
20Mizrahi and Buckwalter (2014) investigated laypeople’s intuitions about the relationship
between progress and justification. As Rowbottom (2015, 103) points out, the study appears
to go against Bird’s contention the intuitive concept of scientific progress requires justification.
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ably normative question, not about the actual extension of a concept that we
happen to possess, but about what types of cognitive changes in science that
ought to be sought and incentivized (see §2). For the purposes of answering
the latter type of question, we should arguably consult our reflective judgments
rather than our untutored intuitions about whether there is progress in such
cases. Of course, the outcome of such a reflection might be that we we may
end up agreeing with what our previous selves were already inclined to say,
i.e. with our original intuitions — but that, too, would be a reflective judg-
ment.
With all this in mind, I turn now to presenting an objection to the justi-
fication requirement — and thus, by implication, to the epistemic account.21
This objection appeals to a type of higher-order evidence, i.e. evidence about
the epistemic character of some other, typically first-order, evidence (Chris-
tensen, 2010; Kelly, 2010). What is interesting about higher-order evidence is
that, in many cases, it undermines or defeats the epistemic justification oth-
erwise provided by the lower-order evidence.22 In science, the first-order ev-
idence is simply what we would usually call ‘scientific evidence’, the type of
evidence that is systematically collected in science and published in scientific
journals (e.g. observational data and experimental results). Thus higher-order
evidence in science could potentially undermine or defeat the epistemic justi-
fication provided by ordinary, first-order scientific evidence. If so, this type of
higher-order evidence in science would, in a roundabout way, prevent progress
from occurring according to the epistemic account — even in cases where our
theories/models are true/accurate.
Consider a form of higher-order evidence that should be particularly fa-
miliar to philosophers of science, viz. historical higher-order evidence. Ac-
cording to a general version of the pessimistic meta-induction (e.g., Poincaré,
1952; Hesse, 1976; Laudan, 1981a), most past theories (including many of the
21See also Dellsén 2021, in which this objection is discussed alongside two other objections
to the epistemic account’s justification requirement on scientific progress.
22The type of higher-order evidence most widely discussed in epistemology is (recognized)
peer disagreement, i.e. situations in which one becomes aware that someone who is equally
competent and equally well informed about some issue has formed a contrary belief to one’s
own (see, e.g., Christensen, 2007).
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most successful ones) have turned out to be false by our current lights; hence,
by enumerative induction, we have reason to believe that most of our current
theories (including many of the most successful ones) will suffer the same fate.
Note that this is an an argument that the supposed historical failures of sci-
entific theories undermines or defeats the epistemic justification for current
theories that would otherwise be provided by the ordinary, first-order scien-
tific evidence in their favor. Thus the historical record is, according to the pes-
simistic meta-induction, a type of higher-order evidence against current the-
ories being epistemically justified. In so far as the pessimistic meta-induction
is successful, no such theories would be epistemically justified, regardless of
how highly confirmed they are by ordinary first-order scientific evidence, be-
cause the historical higher-order evidence would prevent it from providing
justification for current theories.
Admittedly, there are reasons to think that this general version of the pes-
simistic meta-induction greatly overstates the extent to which the historical
record undermines our justification for current theories. Many of the cen-
tral posits of past theories are preserved in current theories (e.g., Kitcher,
1993; Psillos, 1999; Chakravartty, 2007), and current theories are arguably
better confirmed by first-order scientific evidence than their past counterparts
(Roush, 2010; Fahrbach, 2011, 2017). So it is doubtful, at best, that the his-
torical record supports a wholesale conclusion about current theories being
epistemically unjustified. With that said, it seems undeniable that, at least in
some cases, more local versions of the pessimistic meta-induction will indeed
undermine the epistemic justification for scientific theories at various points
in history (Ruhmkorff, 2013; Asay, 2019) — including some episodes that are
arguably paradigmatic of scientific progress.
Thus consider cases where, in a particular scientific domain or discipline
D, scientists have in the past successively adopted theories T1, ...,Tn−1, none of
which are even approximately true by our current lights. Consider a point in
time where the most recent theory in D, Tn, has only recently been adopted.
Then, even if Tn is as well or better confirmed by the first-order scientific evi-
dence than any of its predecessors, the higher-order evidence against Tn could
be sufficiently strong (e.g., because n sufficiently high) to defeat the justifica-
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tion that would otherwise be conferred on Tn. Hence Tn cannot, at least not at
this point, be known. But is it plausible that this historical fact about the previ-
ously adopted theories by itself prevents the adoption of Tn from contributing
to scientific progress? Indeed, supposing that Tn is otherwise of the standard
required for progress, e.g. in enabling us to increase our understanding of rel-
evant phenomena, then isn’t the adoption of Tn all the more progressive given
that previous theories in the same domain D were so far off track?
A historical case, familiar from debates about the pessimistic meta-induction
(Stanford, 2006, 51-140), may be used to illustrate the point. In the latter half
of the 19th century, various theories were proposed by the most eminent bi-
ologists of the day to explain the mechanism by which biological traits are
inherited from one generation to the next. Chief among these were Charles
Darwin’s pangenesis theory, proposed in 1868; Francis Galton’s stirp theory, pro-
posed in 1879; and August Weismann’s germ-plasm theory, proposed in 1892.
Shortly thereafter, between 1902 and 1904, Walter Sutton and Theodor Boveri
independently developed versions of the currently accepted chromosome the-
ory, according to which chromosomes located in all dividing cells carry genetic
information from parent to offspring. Assuming that the chromosome theory
is indeed correct, the three earlier theories were all fundamentally mistaken
in different ways, in that each posited some non-existent carrier of genetic
material — ‘gemmules’ for Darwin, ‘stirps’ for Galton, and ‘germ-plasm’ for
Weismann. Now consider a point in time shortly after Sutton and Boveri’s
theory was proposed. Did their theory contribute to scientific progress at that
time?
According to the epistemic account, the answer must be ‘no’. The historical
record of failed theorizing about heredity, i.e. the pangenesis, stirp, and germ-
plasm theories of Darwin, Galton, and Weismann, respectively, indicates that
this most recent theory will suffer the same miserable fate as these failed the-
ories. Even if the first-order scientific evidence in favor of the Sutton-Boveri
chromosome theory was already strong at the time, the fact that theorizing in
this domain had turned up so many theories that were, by their lights at the
time, mistaken, prevents this evidence from epistemically justifying the chro-
mosome theory in the way it otherwise would have. It follows that scientists’
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accepting or believing the theory did not constitute knowledge, and so that
doing so did not constitute scientific progress on the epistemic account. Thus,
whereas we might have thought that Sutton and Boveri’s chromosome theory
was all the more progressive in virtue of replacing fundamentally mistaken
theories, the epistemic account delivers the opposite verdict that the episode
did not constitute progress at all.
The noetic account offers a very different analysis of these types of cases.
The chromosome theory accurately depicts the underlying causal mechanism
of biological inheritance, which in turn allows us to increase our understand-
ing of, among other things, actual inherited traits (such as the color of your
eyes). Thus, as soon as the chromosome theory was made publicly available,
primarily via Sutton’s publication of the theory in the recently established Bio-
logical Bulletin (Sutton, 1902, 1903), there was progress on the noetic account.
The noetic account does not also require the theory to be epistemically justified
in the sense required for knowledge. Consequently, the historical higher-order
evidence which serves to undermine or defeat the justification for the chromo-
some theory does not in any way prevent it from contributing to progress on
the noetic account. Hence the noetic account, in contrast to the epistemic ac-
count, straightforwardly counts this and similar episodes as constituting sci-
entific progress.
To reiterate an earlier point, however, this does not imply that scientific ev-
idence or confirmation is of no relevance to scientific progress on the noetic
account. If the chromosome theory had not been supported by (first-order)
scientific evidence, such as Boveri’s experiments with sea urchins and Sutton’s
work on grasshoppers, the theory would almost certainly not have been pub-
lished at all, and certainly not achieved the status that it later did. In this
way, ordinary first-order scientific evidence is crucial to scientific progress on
noetic account. What is not crucial — indeed, irrelevant — is whether there
is some historical higher-order evidence available which would prevent this
this first-order scientific evidence from providing the type of epistemic justifi-
cation for scientists’ beliefs in the chromosome theory that would make them
constitute knowledge (in the epistemologist’s sense of the term).
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5 Challenges to the Noetic Account
In this section, I consider several challenges to the noetic account that aim to
show that it is too narrow to account for the full range of cases that plausibly
fall under scientific progress. The general worry here is that by identifying
scientific progress with enabling increased understanding, rather than with
some more general developments such as increased truthlikeness of accepted
theories, we have excluded a variety of developments that ought to count as
progressive. I will consider three specific versions of this worry, viz. that the
noetic account is too narrow in virtue of (i) requiring metaphysical assump-
tions regarding dependence relations, (ii) excluding scientifically important
classification schemes, and (iii) excluding discoveries of previously unknown
phenomena. My contention will be that, ultimately, none of these charges hit
home because the noetic account is not as narrow as one might have thought.
Let me first acknowledge, however, that there are two alternative strategies
for responding to these challenges. The first is to concede that the noetic ac-
count is too narrow as it stands, and subsequently modify the account so as to
incorporate other developments than those that enable increased understand-
ing. There are many ways to do this. Most straightforwardly, one might com-
bine elements of the noetic account with elements of alternative accounts, such
as the truthlikeness account — and say, for example, that progress consists in
enabling increased understanding or truthlikeness.23 The obvious downside
to this hybridization strategy is that it sacrifices the simplicity of the (stan-
dard) noetic account. Ultimately, one may of course end up thinking that this
is a sacrifice worth making. But we won’t know until we’ve really considered
whether the noetic account is able to accommodate the challenges (i)-(iii) with-
out hybridization. So let’s see how far we can get with the (standard) noetic
account before we concede ground to its opponents and adopt a hybrid ac-
count instead.
A second alternative strategy is a revisionist one. Faced with the charge
that the noetic account is too narrow, e.g. in virtue of counting classification
23Although this would require one to find a way to exclude the increases in truthlikeness
that I have argued are non-progressive, such as spurious correlations (see §4.1).
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schemes as non-progressive, one could argue that its narrowness is a virtue
rather than a vice. The narrowness of an account of scientific progress is what
gives it its critical bite — its potential for serving as the basis of philosophically
informed decisions about which research projects to pursue (at all, or at the ex-
pense of others). Note, for example, that an account of scientific progress that
accommodates all scientific developments as progressive can’t ever deliver the
verdict that some projects are not worth pursuing at all, which is one of the
purposes to which such an account would be put.24 So perhaps the correct
response to charges of narrowness is sometimes to embrace it as a desirable
feature of accounts of scientific progress. Although this type of revisionist
strategy is indeed appropriate for some purported cases of scientific progress
(see §5.2 and §5.3) I do not think this works as a general strategy since many
of the apparently-excluded types of developments are just too important to be
counted as non-progressive by any plausible account.
5.1 Excess Metaphysical Baggage?
The first challenge that I will consider is that the noetic account appears to as-
sume, in a way that the truthlikeness and epistemic accounts do not, that there
are certain metaphysical relations in the world, e.g. causation and grounding,
which our dependency models come to accurately represent to some degree
in cases of scientific progress. But what if the world is metaphysically sparse,
devoid of necessary connections between distinct existences, as per Hume’s
well-known dictum (Wilson, 2010)? What if the things we call ‘causation’ and
‘grounding’ are mere shadows of reality, e.g. regularities that we happen to
notice in our experiences? If so, it might seem as if the noetic account would
make scientific progress not just rare, but impossible. After all, there would
be no dependence relations out there in the world for us to represent in such
a way as to make scientific progress possible on the noetic account.
The short response to this challenge is that, appearances perhaps to the
contrary, the noetic account is compatible with metaphysical outlooks that en-
24As emphasized in section 2, accounts of scientific progress are meant to help us evaluate
rather than merely describe scientific developments.
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tirely reject necessary connections in nature. All that’s required for under-
standing is that there be some facts of the matter about what how one thing
depends on (e.g. is caused by) another. It does not matter whether these facts
of the matter are ultimately facts about the fundamental fabric of reality, or
whether they are instead reducible to or explained by other features of reality,
such as regularities in our experiences, our human psychology, or our social
practices. Thus, for example, one can easily pair the noetic account with a reg-
ularity theory of causation, such as Mackie’s (1974), on which causal relations
are nothing over and above certain regularities in the events constituting the
purported causes and effects.25 Since such theories do not deny that — indeed
explain how — some events cause others, they clearly don’t make it impossible
to accurately represent causal relations.
As far as grounding is concerned, the situation is essentially similar al-
though slightly more delicate. A complication comes from the fact that some
authors use the term ‘grounding’ in a way that prejudges metaphysical ques-
tions, e.g. about the independent existence and fundamentality of the ground-
ing relation itself, or about the grounding entity being more fundamental than
what it grounds (e.g., Schaffer, 2009; Raven, 2016). For the purposes of this pa-
per, I don’t mean for the notion of ‘grounding’ to carry any such metaphysical
baggage. Rather, my use of the term is merely meant to refer to a type of non-
synchronic relation that is analogous to causation, and that typically holds
between a reduced object, state, or property, on the one hand, and its reduc-
tive base, on the other hand. Without some such notion, it seems to me that
it would be hard to make sense of the way in which we understand the prop-
erties of water by reducing it to H2O, for example. An accurate and relatively
comprehensive dependency model ought to reflect the ways in which the var-
ious observable properties of water, e.g. its being liquid at room temperature,
depend on its underlying chemical composition (and not vice versa).
But while we thus arguably need something like the notion of ‘ground’ to
account for some types of understanding in science, we don’t need to make any
25Alternatively, one may adopt an agency theory of causation along the lines of Menzies and
Price (1993) for example, according to which causation is ultimately a ‘secondary quality’, due
in part to (non-causal) features of the world and in part to (non-causal) features of ourselves.
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metaphysically loaded assumptions about what it refers to (Dasgupta, 2017).
In particular, we need not posit the existence of any fundamental, primitive,
or unified relation in the world to which the notion refers. Instead we can
agree with ‘grounding skeptics’, who argue that grounding is to be identified
with or reduced to other metaphysical dependence relations, such as type or
token identity, supervenience, or determination (Wilson, 2014; Koslicki, 2015;
Hofweber, 2016), which may or may not themselves be reducible to something
less metaphysically bloated. Alternatively, grounding may well turn out to be
a form of (non-diachronic) causation (Wilson, 2018), in which case reductive
theories of the latter could arguably be applied to the former as well. Fur-
thermore, a possibility left open by the noetic account is that the dependence
relations normally called ‘grounding’ are largely due to mind-dependent psy-
chological facts about what human beings happen to classify as explanatory
rather than any sort of fundamental facts about reality (Norton and Miller,
2019). In any case, it should be clear that the notion of ‘grounding’ to which
I have cautiously appealed above carries no special metaphysical baggage be-
yond what is already needed to account for commonplace scientific reductions
such as that between water and H2O.
5.2 Non-Progressive Classification Schemes?
Another challenge for the noetic account concerns classification schemes used
in science, such as the periodic table of elements and the Linnaean system
of biological classification. The challenge here is that, in contrast to ordinary
physical theories, for example, it is less clear what information about depen-
dence relations is conveyed by such classification schemes. Indeed, one might
argue that in so far as such schemes tell us anything, they merely describe var-
ious properties of the classified entities in a particularly economical manner
without ever taking a stand on the causes or grounds of these entities or their
properties. So does the noetic account imply that developing classification
schemes contributes nothing towards scientific progress?
I think not. To see why, let us start by noting that no plausible account of
scientific progress should count all classification schemes as contributing to
scientific progress. The purpose of any classification is to convey information
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in an efficient manner (Mill, 1874; Mayr, 1974). But all classification schemes
convey some information or other — minimally, they convey that the elements
in a given category satisfy the conditions for membership of that category. So
the question is, what type of information must a given classification scheme
convey in order for its adoption to count as progressive? Here different ac-
counts of scientific progress clearly part ways, in so far as they count different
types of information as progressive. Let us focus on the noetic account, against
which the current challenge is directed. This account implies that progress-
constituting classification schemes convey information about dependence re-
lations, e.g. causal relations, that might hold between the classified entities
or between those entities and other entities not classified in that scheme. In
addition, the noetic account also envisions progress-promoting classification
schemes, which would roughly be those that cause or raise the probability of
enabling increased understanding at some later time.
In my view, it’s plausible that these are precisely the types of classification
schemes that are found to be of value in scientific practice. To substantiate
this claim, consider first the information contained in the periodic table of el-
ements (see Scerri, 2007). The classification of certain elements into groups
serves to highlight the ways in which these elements’ atomic structure is re-
sponsible for their distinctive macro-level properties. For example, the pe-
riodic table nicely conveys the information that the six naturally occurring
elements classified as ‘noble gases’ have similar chemical properties (e.g., be-
ing odorless, colorless, and generally unreactive) due to to having a similar
atomic structure (viz., a full outer shell of valence electrons). Indeed, it is in
virtue of latching onto dependence relations of this type that the periodic ta-
ble enjoys such remarkable predictive success that Mendeleev was able to use
it to predict the discovery of previously unknown elements with pre-specified
chemical properties (Scerri and Worrall, 2001). Far from counting the peri-
odic table as non-progressive, then, the noetic account explains the value of
the periodic table as conveying exactly the type of information that serves to
increase understanding.
Let us also consider the Linnaean system of biological taxonomy, which
classifies each biological species hierarchically into higher taxa at different
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ranks (primarily genus, family, order, class, phylum, and kingdom). Any dis-
cussion of this system is complicated by the fact that there is not agreement
among biologists about which species should be grouped together at each rank
(see Hull, 1988, 158-276). The most widely accepted view, cladism (e.g., Hen-
nig, 1966), holds that biological classification should be based on recency of
common descent and thus reflect the evolutionary relationships between dif-
ferent species. So if two species evolved from a common ancestor, from which
a third species did not evolve, then cladism holds that the two aforementioned
species should at some rank be classified together in a way that excludes the
third. For example, birds and crocodiles share a common ancestor that is not
an ancestor of lizards, so cladism implies that birds and crocodiles should be
grouped together in way that excludes lizards (Sober, 2000, 165-166). Since a
cladistic classification scheme is thus explicitly designed to reflect causal re-
lationships between (current and past) species, it conveys understanding in a
straightforward manner. Thus the development of a cladistic taxonomy clearly
counts as progressive on the noetic account.
What if cladism is rejected, despite its popularity? Even if we think cladism
is correct, we may want our account of scientific progress to be consistent not
just with our preferred view of biological classification, but also with other
views that are taken seriously by working biologists. Here I cannot consider
all alternatives to cladism, but let me nevertheless briefly consider the alter-
native that stands in starkest contrast with cladism, viz. phenetics (e.g., Sneath
and Sokal, 1973). In a phenetic taxonomy, species are grouped together in
higher taxa based on ‘overall similarity’, regardless of how they are evolu-
tionarily related. For example, since lizards and crocodiles are arguably more
similar to each other than either of them is to birds, pheneticists typically hold
that lizards and crocodiles should be grouped together in a way that excludes
birds. The underlying idea behind phenetics is that ‘overall similarity’, e.g.
26For the sake of the argument below, I will assume that phenetic taxonomies directly con-
vey no information about causal relationships. In fact, however, one could argue that most if
not all such taxonomies do convey causal information, e.g. in that the species that are grouped
together in a taxa will have similar causal properties. Although this would be consistent with
my argument below, I will not pursue this line of defense since I think the main purpose of a
phenetic taxonomy is to help us get at the very same type of causal information that cladistic
taxonomies aim to describe.
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in observable traits, is a more objective or theory-neutral basis for biological
classification than evolutionary ancestry. This might seem to go against the
noetic account, in so far as phenetic taxonomies fail to directly convey any
information about causal relationships between species.26
However, things will not seem so straightforward once we consider the
main motivation for developing phenetic taxonomies. Prominent pheneticists,
such as Sneath and Sokal (1973), were motivated not by a desire to avoid causal
relationships between species in biological theorizing. On the contrary, they
maintained that a phenetic taxonomy would be better suited than a cladis-
tic one as a theoretically neutral basis for making inferences about evolution-
ary relationships. On the pheneticists’ view, developing a cladistic taxonomy
risks begging the very question that a biological classification scheme ought
to help us answer, viz. how different species are evolutionarily related. So the
phenetic point of view is that biological classification should contain the data
from which evolutionary relationships are inferred, as opposed to containing
the conclusions of such inferences (see, e.g., Hull, 1988, 117-120). Put differ-
ently, the main point of a phenetic taxonomy is to promote the discovery of
evolutionary relationships, which are causal relations. So while developing a
phenetic taxonomy would admittedly not constitute much scientific progress
on the noetic account, it would certainly — indeed, is specifically designed to
— promote a great deal of progress.27
To sum up, then, the noetic account thus provides a framework for making
sense of the debate from both sides of the cladism-phenetics divide. Cladists
hold that biological classification ought to reflect the underlying causal rela-
tionships between species, so that a taxonomy directly conveys information
that increases our understanding of biological species. According to cladism,
successfully developing biological classification schemes therefore constitutes
scientific progress on the noetic account. By contrast, pheneticists hold that bi-
ological classification ought to reflect the current ‘overall similarities’ between
species, regardless of ancestry. But the point of such classification is to help
27Recall that to count a development as promoting rather than constituting progress is
not necessarily to downgrade its overall importance for scientific progress, since a merely
progress-promoting development might lead to more progress than a progress-constituting
development constitutes (see footnote 11).
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evaluate, in a supposedly theory-neutral way, hypotheses about the causal re-
lationships between species. According to phenetics, successfully developing
biological classification schemes therefore promotes scientific progress on the
noetic account. Either way, the noetic account can effortlessly explain the sci-
entific value of biological taxonomies.
With all of that said, there will of course be some — indeed, infinitely many
— classification schemes that the noetic account counts as more-or-less worth-
less as far as scientific progress is concerned, i.e. as neither constituting nor
promoting any noteworthy amount of progress. If the noetic account is cor-
rect, these will inevitably be a bit silly. For example, consider a classification
of all objects in the universe into those that are less than 10 m from the tip
of my nose in any direction, and those that are outside of this sphere. Pre-
sumably, this classification conveys little or no information about dependence
relations, and promotes little or no discoveries of them either. Hence it counts
as relatively useless for the purposes of scientific progress on the noetic ac-
count (and rightly so). Generally, then, whether a given classification scheme
counts as constituting or promoting progress, or as doing neither, depends on
the classification scheme in question, and the use to which it is put. So, on
the noetic account, the relationship between progress and classification will
have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. I hope it’s clear, however, that the
noetic account does plausibly count as progressive two of the most prominent
classification schemes in current science, viz. the periodic table and Linnaean
taxonomy.
5.3 Non-Progressive Existential Discoveries?
I turn now to a final challenge to the noetic account. Roughly, the challenge
is to account for discoveries of new objects or phenomena, such as previously
unknown biological species, new physical effects, and archeological findings.
The worry is that such discoveries might not enable anyone to increase their
understanding since they don’t necessarily contain information about depen-
dence relations. A closely related worry is that the noetic account might not
count theoretical postulations of (real) entities as progressive, again because
the mere postulation that an entity exists doesn’t necessarily contain informa-
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tion about dependence relations. What unifies these worries is the concern
that the noetic account does not account for progress through what we may
call existential discoveries, viz. empirical or theoretical uncoverings of previ-
ously unknown entities.28
The first thing to note about this challenge is that it is clearly not the case
that all existential discoveries are scientifically progressive — or, if they are,
some are much less progressive than others. Bird (2007) imagines researchers
who count, measure, and classify billions of grains of sand on a particular
beach. As Bird admits, this “adds little to scientific progress” (Bird, 2007,
84). So, a fortiori, had the researchers ‘discovered’ only a particular grain of
sand, this adds even less — if indeed anything at all — to scientific progress.
To take an even more extreme example, consider Charles Dawson’s discovery
in 1921 of the skull fragments that became known as the ‘Piltdown man’. The
composition of these fragments, with canine teeth but a human-like skull, sug-
gested that they came from an early humanoid that might serve as the ‘missing
link’ in the evolution of humans from other primates. However, this discov-
ery was not progressive (indeed, perhaps significantly regressive or progress-
demoting) since the skull fragments turned out to be have been fraudulently
put together in an effort to deceive archeologists — probably by Dawson him-
self (Groote et al., 2016). An account of scientific progress that treated ‘dis-
coveries’ like this as on a par with the discoveries of, for example, quarks and
platypuses, would clearly be inadequate. So the challenge for the noetic ac-
count, or indeed for any account of scientific progress, is not to show how
every existential discovery adds (significantly, or at all) to scientific progress;
rather, it is to show how some select group of existential discoveries do so and
that others don’t (or not as much).
So what would make an existential discovery progressive according to the
noetic account? Well, first of all, the discovery of a new entity often directly
conveys information about dependence relations. For example, the postula-
28It is worth noting that rival accounts of scientific progress, such as the truthlikeness and
epistemic accounts, do not seem to have any trouble counting existential discoveries as pro-
gressive. After all, the addition of a sufficiently truthlike, and/or known, existential statement
would presumably increase the overall truthlikeness of accepted theories, and/or add to the
stock of accumulated knowledge.
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tion and subsequent detection of the up and down quarks directly increase
our understanding of neutrons and protons, because the latter are constituted
by, and thus depend on, the former. This is a case in which the discovered
entities stand in a dependence relation to already known entities that we are
hoping to understand better. There are also cases in which the discovery of
an entity indirectly reveals something about dependence relations between
other entities. For example, the discovery of the platypus, the first egg-laying
mammal to be discovered by Europeans, revealed (to Europeans) that the dis-
tinctively mammalian properties of having mammary glands and fur or hair,
for example, are not caused by the same speciation event as those that cause
most mammals to give birth to live offspring. Put differently, the discovery of
the platypus conveys information about the evolutionary lineage of mammals,
which of course is a type of information about dependence relations between
mammalian species and their ancestral species.
In these examples, existential discoveries convey information about depen-
dence relations, and thus constitute scientific progress on the noetic account.
In other cases, such discoveries only or primarily contribute to progress by
promoting its occurrence at a later time. The most obvious, and perhaps
most common, way in which they might do so is through being evidence for
claims about dependence relations which in turn increase our understanding.
For example, consider Brownian motion, the random fluctuation of particles
suspended in liquids or gases, which was discovered already in 1827 by the
botanist Robert Brown. Since Brown merely observed the phenomenon, and
did not explain it in any way, his discovery conveyed no understanding at
the time, and thus didn’t constitute progress on the noetic account. However,
Brown’s discovery promoted progress in so far as it caused Albert Einstein, in
one of his famous 1905 papers (Einstein, 1956), to provide an elegant expla-
nation of Brownian motion based on the kinetic theory of heat — and, more
generally, the atomic theory of matter. Thus the discovery of Brownian motion
not only promoted progress on Brownian motion itself, but also on the nature
of heat and matter in so far as Brownian motion served as evidence for the
kinetic and atomic theories of these respective phenomena.
Finally, even when existential discoveries do not constitute progress by con-
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veying information about dependence relations, and even when they don’t
promote progress through being evidence for claims about dependence rela-
tions, there is still a third way in which existential discoveries may facilitate
progress on the noetic account. Obviously, one cannot understand something
that hasn’t been discovered. So when we discover an entity or phenomenon
X, we are always enabling progress with regard to X on the noetic account
(where ‘enabling’ is a special case of promotion).29 Consider, for example,
the common but poorly-understood disease variously known as myalgic en-
cephalomyelitis (ME) or chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS). Although the under-
lying causes of ME/CFS are still quite unclear, its status as a distinct disease
has been widely acknowledged in recent years, e.g. by the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) in the United States (Fukuda, 1994). This re-
cent discovery — or, if you prefer, postulation — of ME/CFS is a prerequisite
for an understanding of the disease, e.g. through research into its possible
neurological and epidemiological causes.30
I thus conclude that existential discoveries may count as progressive in
three distinct ways. Many such discoveries, e.g. of the up and down quarks,
constitute progress, since they reveal information about what other more fa-
miliar phenomena, e.g. neutrons and protons, depend on. Other existential
discoveries primarily serve to promote progress through constituting evidence
for claims about dependence relations, e.g. in the way that Brownian motion
led to our current understanding of heat and matter. Finally, all existential
discoveries enable progress on the discovered phenomenon itself; thus, in so
29More precisely, I define ‘enabling’ as a subspecies of promotion that makes progress more
probable by raising its probability up from 0; whereas promoting generally can raise the prob-
ability of progress up from any probability less than 1. (An alternative approach is to sharply
distinguish enabling conditions from causes (e.g., Lombard, 1990), in which case enabling
progress might be thought of as distinct from promoting progress.)
30Does this mean that all existential discoveries enable scientific progress on the noetic
account (or indeed on any account)? Not quite. It is true that, for any phenomenon X, the
discovery of X enables progress on X. However, it does not follow that the discovery of X
is overall progressive, since we might place no significance whatsoever on making progress-
on-X. (See the discussion of Kitcher’s notion of significance in footnote 6.) This is why, I
submit, we wouldn’t count the discovery the nth grain of sand on a beach as adding much to
progress, not even in the sense of merely enabling progress. For although such a discovery
does make it possible to make progress on that particular grain of sand, we simply don’t place
any significance on making progress regarding such a trivial phenomenon.
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far as we care to make progress on that phenomenon, such discoveries auto-
matically promote progress.
6 Conclusion
What is scientific progress? In this paper, I have sought to address this question
in two ways. On the one hand, I have precisified the question itself by intro-
ducing various distinctions, such as that between constituting and promoting
progress, and between progress-on-X and overall progress. Thus precisified, I
have suggested that the most fundamental question of scientific progress con-
cerns what type of cognitive change with respect to a topic X constitutes a
scientific improvement (to a greater or lesser extent) with respect to X. On
the other hand, I have advanced and defended a revised version of the noetic
account of scientific progress. A cognitive change constitutes a scientific im-
provement on X just in case it makes scientific results publicly available so
as to enable relevant members of society, including scientists themselves, to
increase their understanding of X. I have sought to show how this account
can explain various features of scientific practice that be puzzling or inexpli-
cable on alternative accounts, such as why idealized theories are not always
abandoned when more accurate alternative become available, why discover-
ing entirely spurious correlations plays a minimal role in scientific practice,
and why higher-order evidence (e.g. from pessimistic meta-inductions) is not
an obstacle to scientific progress. Finally, I have defended the noetic account
against several challenges that accuse the noetic account of being too narrow
to accommodate the full range of cases of scientific progress.31
31Many thanks to Chris Dorst, James Norton, Elmar Unnsteinsson, and two anonymous
reviewers for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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